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Reciprocity and Grace in the Golden Rule
Proverbial W isdom  as Source for Intercultural Dialogue 
and Moral Theology
Grietje Dresen 
Introduction
After a school committee meeting some other mothers and I came to talk about our 
relationship to the Roman Catholic Church. This was not a regular topic at school 
committee meetings, but they knew it concerned me. One mother said she didn’t see 
anything in Roman Catholic faith anymore. The last straw for her was the weekly 
prayer, right before Holy Communion, with the phrase: ‘Lord, I am not worthy... ’ 
Her entire Catholic education, and her resistance to it, were condensed in this 
formula. Somewhat later we came to talk about the awful things that can happen to 
children these days, for example one mother worked as a nurse in a children’s 
hospital. In that context the first mother said she believed that if some such terrible 
thing were to happen to one’s own child, one would be given ‘strength according 
to one’s cross’ (strength to bear, kracht naar kruis, in Dutch). The spontaneity and 
conviction with which she uttered that traditional religious saying touched me. That 
much she retained of her Catholic background, I thought. If one has a saying like 
that ready at hand and really feels that way, then surely that is a great treasure, 
whether one uses it in a religious sense or not.
This article is about the living ethos expressed in current moral or religious 
proverbs. As a moral theologian I find this - often barely conscious ־ ethos 
fascinating. The ethical systems within philosophy and theology often lack 
connection with a lived ethos, or worse, can even conceal and cripple that ethos 
through their complexity and mutual incompatibility. Of course moral theology and 
moral philosophy can not do without systematic reflection; but any reflection worth 
the name, whether historical, analytical or hermeneutical, that wishes to retain its 
relevance to human life and society, should begin and end with lived practice, in this 
case lived morality. Proverbs are of course not the only, and hardly the most vital 
place of encounter with morality. As I shall illustrate shortly, they constitute a 
preliminary phase of ethics: ethics of the common-or-garden variety. As such, 
however, current and morally relevant proverbs provide useful insight into the tried
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and tested ‘emotional economy’1 of cultures, an insight that can clarify both the 
ethos of a particular culture and the dialogue between cultures.
This article attempts such a clarification in various ways. In the first part, which 
is mainly historical, I shall explain why proverbs as expression of everyday wisdom 
fell out of favour intellectually, and were devalued to the level of popular or 
pedagogical clichés. The conclusion of the first t - and that of the second part ־ 
reflects my firm conviction that in this day and age moral theology cannot afford to 
bypass (moral) pedagogy. For the sake of clarifying what can still inspire us and 
bind us together, people need to learn, preferably at the earliest possible age, to talk 
to one another about what is important to them and why. Therefore I conclude this 
first part with a proposal to use current proverbs as a point of departure for 
intercultural philosophical discussion at schools. In the second part of this article I 
reflect more substantially and hermeneutically on the way in which proverbial 
wisdom could be relevant for theology, i.e. on the way a seemingly sober proverb 
can disclose everyday experiences of care and gracious love. In this part I consider 
more closely a proverb that occurs in many cultures: the so-called Golden Rule. 
Using Paul Ricoeur’s layered interpretation of the Golden Rule in Oneself as 
Another, I intend to show how complex ־ both intuitive and concrete, as well as 
reflectively refined and abstract - the insight in a seemingly simple proverb as the 
Golden Rule can be.
I Proverbs as expression of everyday ethos and source for intercultural 
dialogue
In the example given at the beginning of this article, the Dutch expression ‘strength 
according to one’s cross’ was used quite incidentally. In this incidental fashion, we 
use more proverbs than we realise. Sayings of this kind constitute the deposit of 
everyday life experiences, but owe their transmission to their catchy, stylised form. 
They constitute a condensed and - in the case of living proverbs - recognisable 
expression of how, in a particular culture, emotions are cultivated, forms of 
behaviour appreciated and existential experiences located within the framework of 
a particular understanding of humane nature, the world, and God.2 Insofar as 
proverbs constitute the deposit of a culture’s reflection on human action and the 
condition humaine, including conceptions of good and evil, happiness and 
unhappiness, they may be regarded as a non-academic form of ethics. Proverbs have 
their roots in daily life, but they also have a trans-cultural aspect. Many expressions
1 The term derives from the sociological oeuvre o f Norbert Elias.
2 Cf. P. Berger & T. Luckman, The Social Construction o f Reality (New York: Anchor Books, 
1966), 87; C. Geertz, The Interpretation o f  Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), and Id., 
“Common Sense as a Cultural System”, Antioch Review 35 (1975), 5-26.
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recur in comparable formulations in various languages and cultures.3
To the insight that proverbs interpret the ethos of a people (and in the case of 
illiterate peoples even constitute a unique source) we owe the most extensive and 
well-financed projects for collecting and documenting proverbs. Missionaries and 
missions were eager to employ local proverbs as a point of contact for the 
communication of the Christian message.4 In this article my interest is not 
missionary (at least not in the traditional sense), but ethical. I am interested both in 
living proverbs as an expression of everyday ethos, and in the question of which 
attitude to life and what values might be transmitted through proverbs. Even more 
relevant for moral theology is the intercultural aspect of proverbs, that is to say, the 
question whether and how widely prevalent proverbs could serve as a starting point 
for intercultural dialogue, and as a pointer in the quest for ‘universally’ shared moral 
assumptions.
Before submitting these questions to closer scrutiny, I must consider a 
phenomenon that, in literate Europe, influences the reception and appreciation of 
proverbs. Due to the proliferation of worldviews (as a result of social differentiation 
and the prevalence and accessibility of written texts) and a typically Western, 
enlightened preference for individuality and originality, the use of proverbs has lost 
much of its power. That is not to say that proverbs have become totally extinct in 
pluriform and ‘developed’ countries, but the repertoire has been drastically 
depleted5, and the use of proverbs is easily experienced as old-fashioned or preachy.
Enlightened disdain fo r proverbs as cliché
Let me illustrate the above statement by means of the example with which I began. 
The woman who so naturally used the expression strength according to one’s cross 
undoubtedly picked it up from her Catholic upbringing. I doubt whether young 
people know the expression. And to many people it will sound like a moral cliché 
- to the elderly because of its association with the traditional glorification of 
suffering, to young people because of their unfamiliarity with glorified suffering. 
The same applies to other Christian sayings involving the concept of the cross, like 
‘Ieder huisje heeftzijn kruisje (‘each house has its cross’ ) However, it cannot be 
said that the insight verbalised through this proverb could have no meaning in our
3 Cf. H. V. Cordry, The Multicultural Dictionary o f Proverbs (Jefferson N.C. & London: 
McFarland & Comp., 1997); The Prentice Hall Encyclopedia o f World Proverbs, ed. W. Mieder, 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1986).
4 There are already more than 1000 written collections o f African proverbs. Since 1994, the 
African Proverbs Project has coordinated the research. This project stimulates research and the 
publication of books, bibliographies, and electronic information (on CD-Rom and the Internet). 
Information and links via http:/www.afriprov.org.
5 See for details W. Mieder, “Paremiological Minimum and Cultural Literacy”, in W. Mieder 
(ed.), Wise Words. Essays on the Proverb (New York & London: Garland, 1994), 297-316, 
passim.
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time. Thus the French philosopher Luc Ferry begins his best-seller L ’homme-Dieu 
with a story from the (no less popular) Tibetan Book of the Dead, in which a 
comparable insight is expressed.6 Apparently, what can no longer be said through a 
traditional proverb can be said in the form of a Buddhist tale. Why did the 
verbalisation of insights through proverbs fall out of favour to the extent that it did?
Historical research into the distribution of proverbs in Europe has shown that, in 
learned circles, the use of proverbs has declined noticeably since the second half of 
the seventeenth century.7 Before that time even great authors like Villon, Cervantes, 
Rabelais, Chaucer and Shakespeare, repeatedly refer to the moral wisdom of 
proverbs. Under the influence of Romanticism in particular, a change set in first and 
foremost among intellectuals and in literature. In Romanticism an explicit 
preference for individuality and originality emerged, especially as far as the 
expression of emotions and existential experiences was concerned. Proverbs were 
increasingly regarded as something rather coarse, belonging to the culture of the 
simple and unlearned. In intellectual circles there emerged, as a kind of substitute, 
great enthusiasm for aphorisms, pointed sayings by means of which many 18th and 
19th century philosophers gave expression to their individual wit. These aphorisms 
were subsequently collected in many forms. Thus they in turn began to play the role 
of proverbs for the intellectual elite. During the second half of the nineteenth 
century another predilection - now for the utterances of famous men - was added to 
this.
In Europe, and certainly in the Netherlands, nearly everyone is by now literate. 
The literate masses are familiar with the aforementioned aphorisms and quotations 
in the form of the (now likewise disparaged) ‘Success Diary’ sayings. As a matter 
o f fact, Success Diaries rarely include vernacular proverbs. Proverbs can be found 
on decorated tiles in pubs or toilets, in paremiological studies and dictionaries, and 
in schoolbooks and other lowly valued literary genres. More common are variations 
on proverbs that serve as headlines or attention grabbers in newspapers or other
6 A young woman, obsessed with the wish that her deceased son should come to life again, 
approaches the Buddha for help. Compassionately, he says: ‘There is but one remedy for the 
unhappiness oppressing you. Go to the city and get me a mustard seed from a home in which 
nobody has ever died...’ The conclusion is predictable. There are more than enough mustard 
seeds, but in every house where the woman calls, she hears a story about the heartache that had 
struck the inhabitants. When she returns to the Buddha, she is already on the Way: She has 
learned that no one is spared suffering. It is that insight, and into the source o f suffering 
(attachment to transient things), which softens the suffering and constitutes the beginning of 
enlightenment. L. Ferry, De God-mens o f  de zin van het leven (Amsterdam: Ambo, 1998), 9-10.
7 I follow the extensive article o f an authority in the field, James Obelkevich: “Proverbs and 
Social History”, in Mieder (ed.), Wise Words, 211-252.
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forms of public communication. Graffiti artists, for example, display a certain 
preference for such distorted proverbs.8 Apparently, young people are still familiar 
with quite a few sayings, but they prefer to use them in new ways so that a shift of 
meaning occurs. Young people employ familiar but distorted proverbs in order to give 
their own texts more rhetorical force - more authority, legitimacy or intensity; the 
distortion of the old saying and its surprise effect is used to draw attention to one’s 
very own, new text.9 But from where, then, are these old sayings picked up, if they are 
out of favour in the ‘higher’ culture?
Mother tongue
The sporadic research10 mapping the distribution of proverbs in Western societies 
suggests that, in an urban context, it is especially women who use them, for 
pedagogical purposes informally, in daily life, or formalised, within individual or 
group instruction.11 The use of proverbs in these contexts seems to have a 
predominantly - but not exclusively - moral-pedagogical function.12 By means of 
proverbs, values and codes of conduct are mnemonicallytinscribed, carved into the 
memory. In this context, proverbs often represent a ‘motherly’ wisdom.13 In a 
pedagogical context there is less of the intellectual disdain for the moralistic quality 
of proverbs. After all, everyday interaction and education cannot but consist for a 
great part .n the exchange of moral ‘cliches’. Moreover, educators tend to revert 
unconsciously to the example of those who brought them up. Until recently, that 
example came especially from the mother, simply because she was the one who was 
most often present. Even if a mother rarely uses proverbs explicitly, children will still 
tend to remember from among the proverbs they are taught later - for instance in 
school ־ those that link up with what they already know: the ones that, as it were,
8 J. Nierenberg, “Proverbs in Graffiti. Taunting Traditional Wisdom”, in Mieder (ed.), Wise 
Words, 543-561.
9 Thus is the conclusion o f Nierenberg, “Proverbs in Graffiti”, 558.
10 Over the past two decades, the interest in proverbs as in popular culture has increased. Since 
1984, the journal Proverbium. Yearbook o f International Proverb Scholarship is published 
(completed with Supplement Series since 1998).
11 Obelkevich, “Proverbs and Social History”, 216. That this could be different in agrarian 
contexts is deduced especially from the fact that in agrarian cultures many (often warning) 
proverbs about women circulate. However, this undeniable phenomenon does not have to mean 
that in those contexts men use proverbs more regularly than do women. Probably women use 
gender-neutral agrarian proverbs at least as frequently. The fact that fewer proverbs have been 
passed down with an anti-male bias could point to the conclusion that women, for whatever 
reason, are less inclined to create such a paremiological corpus o f warnings against men. Or (and 
this seems more likely) that such a corpus did exist, but has not been preserved in written form; 
for instance because particular sayings were not recognised as current ones, or because the 
collectors did not have access to female communities.
12 Ibid., 217.
13 Cf. the examples reported in Mieder, “Paremiological Minimum”, 299 and 303-304.
‘click’ with their conscience.
Indeed, many proverbs only acquire meaning at a mature age, or in the context of 
some special occurrence,14 because the proverbs themselves derive from comparable 
life situations. Thus a proverb like lEen mens lijdt nog het meest door het lijden dot 
hij vreesf (‘People suffer most from the suffering they fear’) can lie dormant in the 
sub-conscious for decades, and then suddenly, in a concrete situation, provide insight 
into one’s own anxiety. Something similar probably applies to all ‘religious’ proverbs, 
that is to say, all those proverbs that testify to an active and positive trust in a power 
that transcends the human actor (like I  do my best, God does the rest), and even more 
so at a time when trusting faith in God is no longer taken for granted.
Proverbs as point o f  departure in intercultural philosophical education 
However, these last comments are not meant to suggest that it would therefore be 
senseless to learn religious or ‘sapiential’ proverbs at an early age. On the contrary, 
the ‘empty’ experiential knowledge, formulated by others and inscribed in memory 
in the form of a proverb, cannot only be filled with meaning at a later stage, but can 
also itself offer meaning in the course of that process, just as other, at first 
uncomprehended ritual forms and actions do. At those moments when fitting words 
are sought for extreme experiences, experiences like grief, jealousy or intense 
longing, the meaning thus offered by a proverb can provide something to hold on 
to, a meaning that might otherwise have been discovered only after much searching. 
Therefore I hope that the teaching of proverbs will not be sacrificed because of the 
relentless march of modernisation in schooling. I even see new and interesting 
possibilities for the use of proverbs in education; not so much in language education, 
but in religious or philosophical (‘view of life’) education, especially at schools 
attended by students of diverse cultural and religious backgrounds.
It could be interesting, precisely in such culturally mixed schools, to let children 
from the senior primary or junior secondary levels discuss well known moral and 
sapiential proverbs from their cultures. They could, for instance, first interview their 
parents (or grandparents) as a homework assignment. Probably they would have to 
bring along basic lists of proverbs from their cultural background, compiled with the 
help of immigrant language teachers.15 The provision o f lists does of course have 
a directing influence, but that need not be an objection, since the aim is not represen­
tative paremiological research, but to create an opportunity for (inter-generational
14 Cf. T. B. Rogers, “Psychological Approaches to Proverbs. A Treatise on the Import o f Context” 
in Mieder(ed-), Wise Words, 159-181.
15 Research has shown that people are incapable o f collecting many proverbs ‘dry’, i.e. outside 
o f their contexts. However, this does not reveal much about the number of proverbs they actively 
know or would possibly use in situations calling for them. Cf. Mieder, “Paremiological 
Minimum”, 300.
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and inter-cultural) dialogue on the meaning of proverbs that children understand and 
appreciate. In the ‘interviews’, they could search for the proverbs that their parents 
still know, might possibly use, and, most of all, do appreciate, i.e. recognise as 
expressions of their (often barely conscious) view of life. Reports of the interviews 
and the children’s reactions on them could then be the occasion for further discus­
sion in class: Do the children grasp what a particular proverb intends to convey? 
Can they explicate it in their own words? Can they relate it to concrete situations? 
Is the idea contained in it recognisable to them or not, and if not, why not? Which 
proverbs recur, albeit sometimes in variations, in different cultures?16
In the second part of the present article I focus on the actual content of a proverb 
that would certainly be included in any such inventory: the Golden Rule. In the 
Netherlands the Golden Rule attained the status of a colloquial proverb only in the 
negative formulation: Do not do unto others what you do not wish done to you. This 
negatively formulated version is sometimes called the Silver Rule.17 But whether 
golden or silver, the adjective makes clear that we are dealing with a rule that is 
regarded as extremely valuable. In The Declaration o f a Global Ethic, compiled by 
Hans Kiing, it is even claimed that this rule - whether in positive or negative form 
־ ‘should be the irrevocable, unconditional norm for all areas of life, for families and 
communities, for races, nations and religions’.18 What makes the Golden Rule so 
golden?
II The Golden Rule. Everyday ethos of m utuality, pre-ethical experience of 
gift
The Golden Rule in the negatively formulated version already appears in the sayings 
of Confucius who lived in the sixth century before Christ.19 A variation on the rule 
can be found in the Tao Te Ching, from the fourth century before Christ, in which 
the even more ancient Taoist tradition found written expression.20 Here I limit
16 Cf. Rogers, “Psychological Approaches”, 170-171, for an example o f such a discussion of 
proverbs in an educational (but not explicitly multi-cultural) setting; referring to J. Pasamanick, 
“Talk Does Cook Rice. Proverb Abstraction Through Social Interaction”, International Journal 
o f the Sociology o f  Language, 44 (1983), 5-25.
17 E.g by J. Topel in “The Tarnished Golden Rule (Luke 6:31): The Inescapable Radicalness of 
Christian Ethics”, Theological Studies 59 (1998) 3, 475-485.
18 The Declaration o f  a Global Ethic. Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 3 (1993) 2, 101-113, 
106. The Declaration was submitted to the Parliament o f the World’s Religions in Chicago, 1993.
19 Cf. J. Wattles, The Golden Rule (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), ch. 2. 
Around the same time, the underlying idea o f the Rule was formulated - and passed on through 
oral transmission - in the Hindu and Buddhist traditions; the central concept o f Dharma or 
ordinance o f life rests upon a comparable notion. In Vedic writings this thought appears even 
earlier.
20 Topel, “The Tarnished Golden Rule”, 482.
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myself, due to my poor knowledge of other traditions, to (recent) Western 
interpretations of the rule. So this is no round-table discussion. My exploration is 
meant as an example of hermeneutical reflection on proverbs and, as such, as a 
contribution to a contextual moral theology that is both culturally and inter- 
culturally sophisticated, i.e., capable both of incorporating everyday concerns and 
of putting them into comparative perspective.
An ethos o f reciprocity
In Oneself as Another Paul Ricoeur implicitly corrects the principle of mutuality 
based on exchange (or even retaliation) that Albrecht Dihle21 pointed to as origin of 
the Rule.22 Ricoeur refers to the Golden Rule in his theory of the moral self. In that 
theory Ricoeur distinguishes between three phases or levels of moral reasoning. The 
first and central phase is a substantial exploration of the good, in which three 
dimensions can in turn be distinguished: the question concerning the good life, the 
question of the good life with and fo r others, and the question of the good life in 
community (the classical bonum commune) expressed in institutional terms. These 
first, ‘substantial’ dimensions of the good must be tested and purified with reference 
to (far more procedurally elaborated and institutionally expressed) criteria of the 
right and the just. This critically tested determination of the good and the right must 
then, in the third phase, be applied in a concrete situation with the help of practical 
wisdom or phronesis. The Golden Rule plays an important role especially in the 
second dimension of the first phase, that is to say, in determining what the good life 
with and for others is. Ricoeur quotes both the negatively formulated rule of the 
Jewish tradition23, and the positive formulation in Lk. 6:31 and Mt. 7:12, and 
assumes continuity between these two. He localises this continuity in the formal 
structure of reciprocity in both formulas. In both cases he perceives a resemblance 
between the principle of the Golden (or Silver) Rule, and the formulation of the 
commandment to love one’s neighbour in Lev. 19:18 and Mt. 22:39 (and parallels).
However, in Oneself as Another, where he seeks to develop an autonomous 
philosophical discourse, he gives special attention to the background of the afore­
mentioned formal structure of reciprocity, and concentrates less on the possible
21 A. Dihle, Die Goldene Regel. Eine Einführung in die Geschichte der antiken und 
frühchristlichen Vulgärethik (Göttingen: VandenHoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), 110.
22 P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another (Chicago & London: Univ. o f Chicago Press, 1992). Transi, of 
Soi-même comme un autre (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1990). Cf. Ricoeur’s explicit discussion of 
Dihle’s classical thesis in P. Ricoeur, Liebe und Gerechtigkeit/Amour et Justice (Tübingen: Mohr, 
1990), 50-51. Ricoeur and Dihle refer to the same traditions, namely the classical-philosophical, 
Jewish and Christian traditions o f the Rule.
23 Thus in the book Tobit (4:15) and in the influential Jewish Bible exegetes Hillel en Philo, both 
from the first century.
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theological significance of the resemblance with the commandment of love. The 
latter he interprets, not as a peculiarity of content, but in terms of a meta-ethical 
‘economy of the gift’, in which ‘love is connected to the “naming of God”.’24 Such 
an economy of the gift transcends the (autonomous) determination of the good and 
the right, but without disqualifying it. It is precisely this strict distinction between 
an autonomous dynamic o f  reciprocity and a biblically inspired dynamic o f  
abundance that has elicited criticism, as we shall see.
Ricoeur places the mutuality or symmetry that the Golden Rule assumes against 
the background of a more original dissymmetry: the (grammatically retained) 
dissymmetry between the one who causes to undergo, and the one who undergoes. 
This dissymmetry includes, among other things, the dissymmetry of violence, of 
destructive ways of acting towards others. The negative formulation of the Golden 
Rule calls for an end to this violence in a way reminiscent of the negative 
commandments in the Law (‘Thou shalt not... ’), but formulated on the basis of an 
everyday context of kinship and care. Thus the Golden Rule - ‘one of those received 
notions that the philosopher does not have to invent, but to clarify and justify’25 - 
fulfils a transitional function between a concrete and substantial ethos of care and 
concern (solicitude), and a more abstract formulation of norms in the form of a 
law.26 As such the Golden Rule also mediates between a more substantial, 
eudaemonistic tradition in ethics, and the more formalistic tradition since Kant. In 
order to illustrate this mediating function, Ricoeur elaborates on Kant’s critique of 
the insufficiently formal character of the Golden Rule and on Kant’s transformation 
of the Rule into his categorical imperatives. The Kantian imperatives27 call for 
reciprocity in relation to a supposed, generalised other. The call to reciprocity in the 
Golden Rule, however, originated as the answer to a concrete dissymmetry - an 
answer emanating from a material ethos of care and concern. In the rule of ‘abstract’ 
reciprocity, we discern the echo of that solicitude that is familiar with the concrete 
differences and the mutual dependence between people, but also with the potential 
of violence between them.28
Ricoeur is, first of all, interested in the Golden Rule as expression of an ‘ethical 
sense’, a ‘benevolent spontaneity’29 connected with self-respect, which precisely in
24 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 25.
25 Ibid., 219.
26 See esp. the paragraph VIII,2, Solicitude and the Norm, 218 ff.
27 ‘Act in such a way that the maxim of your will can always hold at the same time as a principle 
of general legislation’ and ‘Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your 
own person or in the person of another, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as 
an end’.
28 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 226-227. Cf. S. Benhabib, “The Generalized and the Concrete 
Other. The Kohlberg - Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory” in Id., Situating the Self Gender, 
Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Cambridge, Polity, 1992), 148-177.
Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 190.
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an asymmetrical situation can recognise the claim of the other. This ethical sense 
originates in the elementary, sensory-affective sensitivity to the neediness and 
suffering of the other that Ricoeur calls solicitude.30 The Golden Rule is an expres­
sion of this caring ethos, but formulated at a more abstract or even (in the Kantian 
imperatives) universalised level, which must in turn be institutionally expressed, and 
prudently concretised. Thus ultimately the Golden Rule plays a role in all three 
phases that Ricoeur distinguishes and relates to one another in Oneself as Another. 
It is precisely the way in which the Rule translates a caring ethos into an abstract 
maxim, still to be institutionally expressed,31 which subsequently, in its concre- 
tisation and application, calls for ‘ethical sense’ and practical wisdom32, that consti­
tutes the ‘transitional structure’ of the Golden Rule in Ricoeur’s interpretation.
A hermeneutical interpretation can thus transform the convictions contained in 
common proverbs such as the Golden Rule into ‘considered convictions’, testifying 
to what Rawls calls ‘reflective equilibrium’.33
Reciprocity and gift
As indicated earlier, Ricoeur’s aim in Oneself as Another is to develop an 
autonomous philosophical discourse. He does elaborate on the Golden Rule as it 
was formulated in Judaism and Christianity, but he seeks to interpret the ethos of 
care and the structure of reciprocity within it, in a non-religious explanatory model. 
That is why he does not specify the relation of the Rule to the Jewish and Christian 
commandment of love, as indeed he does in other texts.34 So particularly in his 
famous address Liebe und Gerechtigkeit, Ricoeur explicitly considers biblical agape 
as taking its meaning from a religious ‘economy of the gift’, and situates it over 
against the ethos of reciprocity he displays within the Golden Rule. In Oneself as 
Another, however, Ricoeur explicitly abstains from a theological discourse of love, 
because it is supposed not to add anything material to the argumentation.35
In a fascinating article on Ricoeur’s interpretation of the Golden Rule, the 
Christoph Theobald questions Ricoeur’s banishing o f theology in Oneself as 
Another. Theobald’s questions intrigued me, although I do appreciate Ricoeur’s
30 Ibid., 191-192.
31 See e.g. ibid., 226-227.
32 Thus - referring to the Golden Rule - ibid., 265-266.
33 Ibid., 288 (cf. 226-227).
34 Cf. P. Ricoeur, Liebe und Gerechtigkeit/Amour et Justice׳, and Id., “The Golden Rule. 
Exegetical and Theological Perplexities”, New Testament Studies 36 (1990), 393-397. In Oneself 
as Another the commandment o f love is only referred to incidentally (cf. 194; 219; 351) as an 
invitation from the everyday ethical domain that has not yet been turned into law, and that - thus 
formulated - never can become law.
35 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another 25.
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striving for an autonomous philosophical argumentation, which is indispensable in 
an ‘hermeneutical age of reason’36. However, like Theobald, I find it important to 
attempt to find within such an argumentation, the words for a ‘poetics of agape’, for 
the significance of the experience of love as a gift.
Theobald points out that in those texts where Ricoeur does explicitly consider the 
relation between the Golden Rule (as structure of mutuality) and the commandment 
of love (as ‘economy of the gift’), he assumes a certain discontinuity between the 
two. Theobald wonders, however, whether there is not perhaps a more fundamental 
continuity hidden behind the apparent discontinuity, insofar as such an economy of 
the gift might be operative precisely in the ethos of care from which the Golden 
Rule derives.37 Theobald sees this dimension operative especially where Ricoeur 
speaks of ‘the paradox of the exchange at the very place of the irreplaceable’: in the 
willingness to take the perspective of the other without denying his or her 
uniqueness.38 If the different levels on which the Golden Rule is functioning are 
interrelated (as Ricoeur shows), then why should philosophy and theology be so 
strictly separated according to a supposed boundary between autonomous 
philosophy and a discourse of the gift, as Theobald asks. Why should philosophy, 
for the sake of its autonomy, exclude a ‘poetics of agape'li9 Are ‘the gestures and 
words of the latter not also accessible for philosophy as philosophy’?40
Like Ricoeur, Theobald does reserve the faithful naming of the experience of gift 
(i.e. grace) for theology; a theology that for the sake of a God who transcends all 
singular convictions, cannot evade philosophical argumentation. He is convinced 
though that a philosophical recognition of the function of the experience of gift 
within a phenomenology of conscience need not lead to crypto-theology within 
philosophy, but, on the contrary, could contribute to a better understanding of the 
ethical dimension of solicitude or (more precisely) of the capacity and willingness 
to step into another’s shoes - the dimension in which, according to Ricoeur, the 
Golden Rule originates.41 A philosophy that does not hesitate to name and specify
36 Ibid..
37 C. Theobald, “La règle d’or chez Paul Ricoeur. Une interrogation théologique”, in J. Greisch 
(ed.), Paul Ricoeur. L ’herméneutique à l ’école de la phénoménologie (Paris: Beauchesne, 1995), 
139-158, 151. The article has been illuminating in my reading o f Ricoeur.
38 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 193-194 [cf. footnote 32 there],
39 The paraphrase ‘poetics o f agapè’ refers to Ricoeurs definition and location of a discourse of 
agape in Liebe und Gerechtigkeit, 12-13 ff  and 20-21 ff; cf. Oneself as Another, 25.
40 Theobald, “La règle d’or”,151.
41 Ibid., 156. A comparable argument, concerning the significance of the capacity for empathy and 
listening as a condition for the functioning o f more abstract, procedural theories o f justice (e.g. 
the ideal of non-dominating communication in Habermas’ theory o f communicative action, and 
the [willingness to accept the] veil o f ignorance in Rawls’ Theory o f Justice) is formulated by 
ethicists o f care as a complement to these more procedurally functioning theories o f justice. Cf. 
Benhabib, Situating the Self, and I.M. Young, “Asymmetrical Reciprocity. On Moral Respect,
Grietje Dresen152
this dimension could make an important contribution to the political, agnostic debate 
that seeks the roots for tolerance and sense of community within the various 
religions or ‘views of life’, as Theobald argues. Not in order to find, in these views 
o f life, an ultimate foundation for that society as a rightful institution ־ for such 
foundation should not be sought in God, but in the institutions themselves, in the 
way justice is organised in them - ,  but rather to leave philosophical room for a 
hidden God, i.e. to leave room for a way to think of God as ‘hidden, but 
simultaneously showing in the moral spontaneity of human conscience’.42
The Golden Rule can be seen as the expression of such a moral spontaneity in 
which ‘God’ is hidden, precisely in the layered interpretation Ricoeur gives to it. 
Theobald himself tries, as a complement to Ricoeur’s conscious option for 
philosophical agnosticism in Oneself as Another, to name theologically the place 
where we might find God in the context of the evangelical Golden Rule. In doing 
so, he focuses not so much on the specific meaning of the Golden Rule in Luke’s 
Sermon on the Plain, but on the so-called fulfilment formula in Mt. 5:17, to which 
Matthew’s version o f the Golden Rule in 7:12 refers (‘Always treat others as you 
would like them to treat you: that is the Law and the Prophets’). In Theobald’s view, 
the fulfilment of Law and Prophets, of which Matthew speaks here, is connected 
with the theme of substitution, which plays such an important role in Matthew43
With reference to the context and interpretation of the Golden Rule, he speaks of 
a ‘Messianic drama’, and connects this drama both with the theme of substitution 
in Matthew and with the dynamic that Ricoeur calls the ‘paradox of the exchange 
at the very place of the irreplaceable’. The evangelical Golden Rule is not new44, 
according to Theobald, but perhaps the context o f the fulfilment formula and of 
Luke’s Sermon on the Plain provides it with a (literally and figuratively) 
superabundant dimension. ‘This capacity or this power [to take the perspective of 
the other while recognising his or her uniqueness, GD] is the true place of 
fulfilment, of which the total and “overflowing” dimension discloses itself in the 
commandment of love and of love for one’s enemies, which lie hidden in the Golden 
Rule.’45 In the context of the Gospel, what is at stake here is not primarily an 
exhortation to do the nearly impossible, but an appeal to what has already been
Wonder and Enlarged Thought”, in Id., Intersecting Voices. Dilemmas o f  Gender, Political 
Philosophy, and Policy (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), 38-59.
42 Theobald, “La règle d’or”, 158; see also 157.
43 Thus e.g. in Mt. 25:31-46, in the way Jesus calls for the performance o f Jewish works of 
righteousness.
44 In “The Tarnished Golden Rule”, the Luke scholar J. Topel exerts himself (as did others before 
him) to show that the evangelical version o f the Golden Rule is new, closely related to the 
evangelical love commandment.
45 Theobald, “La règle d’or”, 154.
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given. Theobald writes, ‘Matthew seems to lean on the memory - mediated by the 
Son of Man - of having been in the situation of the other oneself, and having 
benefited from the sympathy of another, in order to rouse that “always greater” 
capacity for putting oneself in the place o f another.’46
What is at stake theologically, in this ‘drama of messianic fulfilment’, is not the 
rather tragic tension between the norm and the complexity of everyday life47, nor the 
question of autonomy versus heteronomy in moral judgement, but the question of 
whether and how the experience of God’s abundance - the experience of grace - can 
be translated into a kind of human action and judgement in which this abundance 
shows48.
The experience o f  grace in everyday life
The evangelical, positively formulated Rule has not become a current proverb in 
Dutch. Does this mean that there is no room for the experience of grace in the 
everyday ethos of Dutch society? I think - or hope - nothing is further from the truth. 
Let me explain this by returning to the pedagogical context in which my interest in 
the Golden Rule originated49. After all, proverbs are kept alive especially in pedago­
gical contexts, as we have seen.
To the supposed universality of the Golden Rule, it is often objected that the 
Golden Rule is in fact not a common proverb in all cultures. The ethical ground-rule 
put forward in it implies - as Ricoeur explains - an individual process of conscience 
formation. To be sure, the procedure as such does imply a capacity for empathy or 
sympathy, as Ricoeur and Theobald have shown, but the train of thought itself has 
an individual point of departure, and is realised individually and internally. In 
cultures where actions are primarily determined and judged by community life and 
by concrete - if not external - codes of behaviour, a proverb such as the Golden Rule 
will therefore be less likely to emerge, or to take deep root.50
This correction is probably to the point as a criticism of the supposed universality 
of the Golden Rule. However, in so-called modem, complex societies, moral 
formation will always have to proceed via a process of individual conscience forma­
tion (even if it is granted that this process is influenced from the outside, by parents 
and social environment). In modern societies individuals are not borne by a single,
4 7 I b i d "
Ibid., 155 Theobald is referring here to Ricoeur’s commentary on the theme o f Antigone.
48 Comparable to the way in which Mt. 5:17-48 calls for doing more than just the required 
righteousness; ibid., 155-156.
49 The same applies for Wattle’s interest in the Golden Rule, cf. The Golden Rule, Preface, vi.
50 Thus my inquiry on the relevant discussion list [proverbs-list@afriprov.org] yielded no African 
versions o f the Golden Rule as such [my thanks to J.G. Healey M.M. and D. Sybertz M.M.], and 
the CD-Rom African Proverbs does not have Golden Rule as a keyword. All this need not imply, 
however, that the proverb does not occur - probably it does in more concrete and figurative 
versions.
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closed community, and thus have to face the demands of their own lives for 
themselves. Precisely in those societies where diverse cultures are united and must 
live, talk and deal with one another, fixed ethical codes that cannot be argumen­
tatively illuminated by the speakers themselves may well have violent repercussions 
in social intercourse and ethical debate. As a mother of young, but rather streetwise 
children, living and attending school in a multicultural neighbourhood, I notice that 
if I explain to my children the rules I set for them, I often fall back upon simple 
variations of the Golden Rule, such as ‘You wouldn’t like that, would you?’ or 
‘What if everyone were to do that?’ (which is actually a simple variant of the first 
categorical imperative). Precisely because of this relying on the Golden Rule myself, 
I became interested in the currency of this and other proverbs in other cultures.
However, at the same time, I note that at such moments I do indeed revert to 
variants of the negatively formulated Rule. That is quite natural in the context, for 
the rules concern bans: don’t tease other; don’t make a mess in the park, etc. Calling 
on children to do well would be going a little bit far. Does that mean that the 
experience of grace and the dynamic of gift based upon it, which Theobald reveals 
to be the very heart o f the evangelical Rule, cannot come to life in a pedagogical 
context? I think this is far from the truth. Not only can even young children truly 
feel concern or compassion for another (another child in pain, for instance)51, but 
they want to express their concern or their love explicitly, and preferably as tangibly 
as possible, by giving something.
This is not the place for an extensive account of how children’s capacity for 
empathy and love can be smothered if they grow up in constraining circumstances. 
However, a society that does not do the utmost to prevent or to ease such 
constraining circumstances loses any basis on which to speak of ‘norms and values’. 
Theobald saw the capacity for empathy and love of neighbour in Matthew’s ‘lean 
on the memory - mediated by the Son of Man - of having been in the situation of the 
other oneself, and having benefited from the sympathy of another’.521 do not want 
to suggest that the experience of God’s love is reserved for those to whom others 
have already done well. God’s love must be greater and more just. But I do think we 
should read this dynamic of the exchange of places as an appeal not to hinder the 
conditions for developing the ability to love (to feel and to give love), and to do our 
best to let children’s capacity for love grow to its full potential. In a pedagogical 
context, children live, first and most fundamentally, by the grace of another. If that 
other does not evoke the capacity for exchanging places through his or her love and 
care, the expressions of reciprocity and gift offered by Scripture and tradition -
51 Cf. P. D. Hastings et al., “The Development o f Concern for Others in Children with Behavior 
Problems”, Developmental Psychology 36 (2000) 5, 531-546 (and references there).
52 See note 46.
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including proverbs like the Golden Rule - run the risk of remaining mere dead 
letters.
Respect is a gift - not a given
Both in developmental psychology53 and in recent discussions on care ethics, great 
emphasis is laid on this intergenerational transmission of (the capacity for) vicarious 
emotional responding and perspective-taking skills. In the past these skills were 
mainly handed down in matrilineal transmission, from mothers to daughters. 
Empathy, concern for others, and the capacity for affective perspective taking were 
looked upon as female skills. In present and future times, however, it is and will be 
more and more important that both women and men develop these qualities. The 
complexity of our modem, multicultural societies demand of men and women 
capable of good listening, empathy and care taking, not only in private life, but also 
in the public domain and in institutional settings.
Like Ricoeur, the feminist political philosopher Iris Marion Young stresses the 
asymmetrical character of the reciprocity implied in most social contacts and in 
moral and political dilemmas. But unlike Ricoeur (whose work she does not quote), 
she does not see much in changing perspectives. In order to communicate and deal 
fairly with one another, we need not so much adopt the position of the other, she 
argues, for doing so we risk overlooking the particularity of the other. The concept 
of asymmetrical reciprocity she develops supposes the willingness to really listen 
to another, in order to let the other express her own point of view. This openness or 
‘wonder’ (as Young calls it, following Luce Irigaray) she parallels with the practice 
of giving gifts. As in gift-giving, reciprocity in communication is asymmetrical, 
facilitated through our willingness to communicate, i.e. to listen and to speak out.54
I find this concept of asymmetrical reciprocity developed by Young - and already 
adopted by feminist theorists o f care55 - to be of value because of its stressing real 
openness towards the other. However, it does not cover the vital aspect of con­
science formation by learning to see oneself as another, nor the social and institu­
tional levels of moral reasoning that Ricoeur incorporates in his threefold model in 
Oneself as Another. In Ricoeur’s model, too, the observation of asymmetry is crucial 
for each step to be made; but for him, the willingness to change perspectives as 
formulated in the Golden Rule also offers a clue for determining the righteousness 
of individual decisions and of social institutions. Above all, the differentiating inter­
pretation of the Golden Rule by Ricoeur, completed by Theobald’s motivational 
reading of the theme of substitution and vicarious responding in Matthew, also
53 E.g. N. Eisenberg et al.,“The Relations o f Parental Characteristics and Practices to Children’s 
Vicarious Emotional Responding”, Child Development 62 (1991), 1393-1408.
54 Young, “Asymmetrical Reciprocity”, 41 and 54 ff.
55 E.g. S.L. Sevenhuijsen, Deplaats van de zorg. Over de relevantie van zorgethiek voor sociaal 
beleid (Utrecht: Universiteit Utrecht, 2000), 14 ff.
accounts for the origin of the willingness to listen that Young supposes but does not 
go into. The willingness to listen presupposes respect for the other. And true respect 
for others is something we have to learn, by being respected ourselves. The 
experience of being valued ourselves teaches us the worth of being valued, and thus 
awakes the attitude of respect that is a vital condition for genuine openness towards 
others.
In a rich study on the principle of reciprocity, the Dutch law philosopher Dorien 
Pessers states that altruism and respect can be seen as a gift inviting other gifts, 
‘according the moral rule of do quia mihi datum est: I give to others because once 
there has been given to me. In the same way altruism can be understood as an ethic 
of gift giving’.56 The experience of gift (or, in religious terms, of grace), gained in 
everyday situations of care and concern, underlies an interpretation of the Golden 
rule that does not mean to ignore the uniqueness of the other but, on the contrary, 
aims at true respect for the other as an other self.
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56 D. Pessers, Liefde, solidariteit en recht. Een interdisciplinair onderzoek naar het wederkerig- 
heidsbeginsel (Amsterdam: Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid, 1999), 245.
